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1 Introduction
Foreign exchange markets are excessively volatile and risky due to spec-
ulative bubbles and crashes. These transitory bubbles and crashes do not
reveal rational arbitrage-free pricing behavior but might be due to irrational
and trend-chasing behavior of speculators. Because trend-chasing behavior
and short-term speculation leads to excessive risks, policy instruments like
transaction taxes are proposed for reducing speculative attacks and exces-
sive risks.
Survey data of foreign exchange markets yields empirical evidence of het-
erogenous expectations among traders. Due to survey studies like the one
conducted by Taylor, M. and H. Allen (1992), these short term ex-
pectations are excessively volatile and display extrapolation behavior, while
long term expectations are regressive and therefore of a stabilizing nature.
Based on this empirical fact several studies like Brock and Hommes
(1997, 1998), Chiarella and He (2002), DeGrauwe and Grimaldi
(2006) and Lux and Marchesi (2000) start to incorporate heterogenous
expectations into economic models of exchange rate determination.
Because econometric tests on rational expectations in the foreign exchange
market1 are rejected and the eﬃcient market approach cannot explain the
stylized facts of ﬁnancial market time series, researchers switched to the
chartist-fundamentalist approach based on the empirical evidence of het-
erogenous expectations from survey studies. This model framework is an al-
ternative expectations hypothesis and an appealing building block for mod-
els of the foreign exchange market. It assumes that traders are bounded
rational in that they do not use all available information and economic
1See Taylor and Allen (1992) and Menkhoff (1997) among others.Markus Demary
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models to forecast the exchange rate. Instead they rely on simple rules of
thumb because they do not know the whole structure of the model. Most
of these interacting agent models assume that the market is populated by
two types of traders. The chartist trader type searches for patterns in past
exchange rates like trends and trend reversals for forecasting future rates,
while fundamentalist traders search for over- and undervaluations and ex-
pect them to be corrected in the future. Moreover, this approach allows
agents to choose endogenously one of this two views of the world. The suc-
cess of this model framework to explain stylized facts of ﬁnancial markets
like the exchange rate disconnect, excess volatility, volatility clustering and
excess kurtosis encourages to elaborate on them. Moreover, there is also
empirical evidence for the chartist-fundamentalist approach2.
Studies like Westerhoff (2003) use the chartist-fundamentalist approach
for analyzing the eﬀects of market regulations in foreign exchange markets.
Westerhoﬀ ﬁnds that small transaction taxes lower exchange rate volatility
while a high Tobin tax rate will lead to an increase. He explains this ﬁnding
with the composition of chartists and fundamentalists in the population.
Small transaction taxes make destabilizing chartism unproﬁtable and in-
crease the fraction of fundamentalist traders which stabilizes the exchange
rate. If the tax rate exceeds a certain threshold also fundamentalism will
be unproﬁtable and the fraction of chartist traders will rise, so that this
destabilizes the exchange rate again and volatility will rise.
Mannaro et al. (2005) ﬁnd in their simulation study within an artiﬁcial
stock market framework that volatility will fall by 2% for a tax rate of 0.1%,
2Engle and Hamilton (1990) ﬁnd that there is regime switching in exchange rates in
that there are phases of trends and mean-reversion. Vigfusson (1997) ﬁnds empirical
evidence by estimating parameters of the chartist-fundamentalist model in a Markov-
switching framework.Markus Demary
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while it will fall by 8% for a tax rate of 0.5% with respect to the reference
situation without taxes. Moreover, the percentage fraction of fundamental-
ists will rise due to the imposition of the transaction tax. In a simulation
with only random traders and chartists a small tax can also lead to a small
increase in volatility.
In this paper we want to introduce an extended version of the chartist-
fundamentalist model for the foreign exchange market. Our model is similar
to the models of Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), Chiarella and He
(2002) and DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) among others. In contrast
to these models we allow agents to choose between diﬀerent investment
horizons, such that there are short-term chartists and fundamentalists and
long-term chartists and fundamentalists. Moreover, we also deviated from
the commonly used discrete choice model for the evolution of trading rules
and introduce another evolutionary mechanism that also allows to choose
between diﬀerent investment horizons. Simulations of the baseline model
show that the model does well in replicating stylized facts like the unit-root
property of exchange rates, clustering of return volatility and excess kurtosis
in the distribution of returns.
The second task of our paper is to introduce transaction taxes into the
model in order to analyze, how these taxes inﬂuence traders behavior and
ﬁnancial market risks. Simulations yield the result that on the microscopic
level transaction taxes prevent long term traders to switch to short term
speculation. On the macroscopic level these taxes reduce the variance of
exchange rate returns but also increase their kurtosis. Moreover, the tax
harms short-term speculation in favor of long-term investment, while it also
harms trading rules based on economic fundamentals in favor to trend ex-
trapolating trading rules.Markus Demary
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section
presents the model economy, while section three will present the numeri-
cal analysis of the model, while section four concludes.
2 The Model Economy
The model is similar to that proposed by De Grauwe and Grimaldi
(2006). Building blocks of the model are
(i) the agents’ portfolio selection problem,
(ii) the agents’ forecasts via diﬀerent forecasting models,
(iii) agents’ evaluation of these portfolio rules by comparing their past
proﬁtability, and
(iv) in our model the exchange rate is set by a market maker in contrast to
DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) , while traders are also allowed
to choose between diﬀerent investment horizons.
2.1 Fundamental Factors and Arbitrage
In this model the fundamental factors driving the exchange rate are the
gross rates of return on the domestic and foreign bond with one-period
maturity. We assume both interest rates R = (1 + r) to follow stochastic
mean-reverting processes of the form
lnRt = (1 − α)lnR + αlnRt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0,σ
2), (1)Markus Demary
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where R is the long-run average interest rate, α ∈ [0,1] is the rate of mean-
reversion and εt is a random innovation to the interest rate.
Analogue, the rate of return on the foreign one-period-bond follows
lnR
∗








Assuming homogeneous interest rate expectations and that all agents know
the data generating processes for the interest rates, they can price the long-
term bonds according to the expectations hypothesis of the term structure.
The expectations hypothesis states that no arbitrage should be possible
between the rates of return of a long-term bond and the rates of return of
a sequence of one-period bonds over the maturity of the long-term bond.







Using the fact that the n-period-ahead forecast of the autoregressive process
for the interest rate is
Et lnRt+n = α
n lnRt + (1 − α
n)lnR (4)















Figure 1 shows the time series of short-term and long-term interest rates
of a typical simulation run.Markus Demary
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Fig. 1: Fundamental Factors


























Note: Model generated time series from the baseline simulation. The used parameter
values are those given in table 1. The ﬁrst 1000 data points were removed.












arise because interest rates follow stochastic processes. This deviation
promises proﬁts for foreign exchange traders and provokes them to demand
foreign currency in the ﬁnancial market. Note, that st is the bilateral ex-
change rate, while τ is the transaction tax rate. If this equation holds with
equality the expected interest rate change will oﬀset the interest rate dif-
ferential and no trade will occur, because all proﬁts are already arbitraged
away.Markus Demary
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2.2 Traders’ Demand for Foreign Currency
Following DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) we assume that each agent
can invest into a domestic asset and a foreign asset. In contrast to De-
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) both assets are risky due to the random-
ness of domestic and foreign interest rates and due to exchange rate risks.
We assume overlapping generations of traders, who enter the market for
their pertinent investment horizon. Afterwards they will leave the market
and consume their proﬁts. The timing of each period is as follows:
(i) trader i enters the market. He observes interest rates, the exchange
rate and the past proﬁts of the other traders. Depending on the past
proﬁts of the other traders, he decides to be a short-run or long-run
fundamentalist or to be a short-run or long-run chartist trader,
(ii) depending on the interest rate diﬀerential and his expected depreciation
of the exchange rate the trader decides how much to invest in the
domestic and the foreign asset,
(iii) after the trader has realized his proﬁt, he leaves the market and con-
sumes.
Agents are assumed to have preferences towards risks with constant absolute







t is agent i’s wealth at time t, n ∈ {1,...,N} is the agents’ invest-
ment horizons, and αi is the agents Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute riskMarkus Demary
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where R = (1+r) and R∗ = (1+r∗) are the gross returns on the domestic and
foreign bond, while st is the bilateral exchange rate between both countries.
The tax rate for foreign exchange market transactions is denoted with τ ∈
[0,1]. The ﬁrst part is the return on the foreign asset, while the second term
measures the costs of borrowing in the domestic country. For n = 1 and
τ = 0 this budget constraint collapses to the one proposed by DeGrauwe
and Grimaldi (2006).
If we assume wealth to be normally distributed we can simplify the portfolio















subject to the same budget constraint. Maximization yields the following




















Thus, trader i’s demand is decreasing in his degree of risk aversion, in a
higher risk σ2
i,t, decreasing in the transaction tax rate τ, and increasing in
the expected proﬁt. For n = 1 and τ = 0 the demand function collapses to
the one used in DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006).
If we assume, following Brock and Hommes (1997) that the risk evaluation
is the same for all agents and constant over time, the demand functionMarkus Demary
















2.3 Traders’ Forecasting Models
We assume that the true data generating process for the exchange rate is
unknown to the agents. Therefore they use ad-hoc rules for forecasting. We
assume that two types of forecasting rules are used. A rule which reacts
on trends in the exchange rate is commonly called chartist rule or technical
trading rule. The other technique called fundamentalist forecasting rule
looks for over- and undervaluations of the exchange rate with respect to its
arbitrage free fundamental value and expects a reversion back to it.
The fundamentalist forecasting rule for the one-step-ahead prediction of the
exchange rate can be written as
E
f
t[st+1 − st] = κ
f   (s
f
t − st). (12)
Thus, this rule predicts an exchange rate change such that κf 100% of the
disequilibrium s
f
t −st, that is the deviation of the realized exchange rate st
from the arbitrage-free exchange rate s
f
t, will be corrected by the subsequent
exchange rate change. Note that the two step ahead forecast assumes that
κf 100% of the remaining disequilibrium (1−κf) (s
f
t −st) will be corrected




t[st+n − st+n−1] = κ
f(1 − κ
f)
n−1   (s
f
t − st). (13)Markus Demary
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For n = 1 this forecasting model collapses to the one used in DeGrauwe
and Grimaldi (2006), Lux and Marchesi (2000), Chiarella and He
(2002) and Brock and Hommes (1997).
The expected exchange rate change E
f
t[st+n] can be derived from the fore-
casted exchange rate changes as
E
f
t[st+n] − st = E
f
t[st+n − st+n−1] + E
f










t − st), (14)
where the explicit derivation can be found in the appendix.
Fundamentalists believe that the arbitrage-free exchange rate s
f
t is the ex-











t realizes, the exchange rate change oﬀsets the possible proﬁts
from the interest rate diﬀerential and no arbitrage should be possible.




t[st+1 − st] = (κ
c)   (st − st−1). (16)
Thus, this forecasting model predicts a trend continuation. If the exchange
rate change st − st−1 is one, than this forecasting model predicts the next
exchange rate change to be κc. As usual in the theory of autoregressive
models we use the last period’s forecast to predict the next future exchange
rate if we do not have information about realizations. Thus, the two-step-
ahead forecast expects an exchange rate change of (κc)2 and so on. Thus,Markus Demary
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the n-step-ahead prediction will be
E
c
t[st+n − st+n−1] = (κ
c)
n   (st − st−1). (17)
For n = 1 this forecasting model collapses to the one used in DeGrauwe
and Grimaldi (2006), Lux and Marchesi (2000), Chiarella and He
(2002) and Brock and Hommes (1997).
Equivalent to the fundamentalists’ technique, chartists calculate the ex-
pected exchange rate change E
c
t[st+n − st] as
E
c
t[st+n − st] = E
c
t[st+n − st+n−1] + ... + E
c
t[st+1 − st] (18)
=
1 − (κc)n
1 − κc   κ
c   (st − st−1), (19)
where the explicit derivation can be found in the appendix.
2.4 Evolution of Trading Rules
The agents’ strategy space consists of ﬁve trading rules. The agent can either
be a short-run fundamentalist or a short-run chartist, or the trader can be
a long-term fundamentalist or a long-term chartist. The ﬁfth possibility for
the agents is to stay inactive, that means not to trade.Markus Demary
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t  − → t + N
t  − → t + 1
t  − → t + N
t  − → t + 1
t  − → t + N t  − → t + N t  − → t + 1 t  − → t + 1
Note: The abbrevation SRTT denotes short-run technical trader, while LRTT denotes
long-run technical trader, while SRFT denotes short-run fundamental trader and LRFT
long-run fundamental trader. The ﬁfth alternative for traders is to stay inactive for one
period which is not included in the graphic.
Because we assume that agents may have multi-period investment horizons,
the information concerning the individual agents investment horizon is saved




     


1 1 100 84 1
1 1 61 31 1










The ﬁrst two columns of this matrix identify the short run fundamental-
ist and the short run chartist, who have an investment horizon of one by
construction. Columns three and four identify the long term fundamental-
ist and the long term chartist and the time until their investment matures.
Agents are allowed to stay inactive for one period. This information is given
in column ﬁve. Agents 1,...,M are given in rows. Thus, this matrix reads asMarkus Demary
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follows. If agent 1 is a long run fundamentalists, then the time to maturity
of his investment is 100 periods. If he is a long term chartist, then the time
to maturity is 84 periods. This matrix is updated as follows
Φt+1 = Φt − [0,0,1,1,0], (21)
where 0 is a 1 × M vector of zeros, 1 is a 1 × M vector of ones and M is
the number of agents. Thus, the investment horizon of long term agents
decreases by one period until maturity is reached. After that it switches
back to the maximum investment horizon of N periods. The starting value
for this updating process is generated by a random draw for the columns
three and four.
Agents are only allowed to change their trading rules when maturity is
reached. Thus short-term traders and inactive traders are allowed to switch
every period, long term traders are not allowed to switch for N periods.
The information about which agent is allowed to switch is contained in the
matrix St, with
St(i,j) = 1 ⇐= Φt(i,j) = 1 (22)
St(i,j) = 0 ⇐= Φt(i,j)  = 1. (23)
Thus, if St(i,j) = 1 then agent i is allowed to change his trading rule, if he
is type j. If St(i,j) = 0, then agent i with trading rule j is not allowed to
change his type. Because this matrix only contains information if an agent
is allowed to switch or not. The matrix tells us for example that agent one
is allowed to change his type, if he is type one, two or three, but he is not
allowed to switch if he is type four. Thus, this matrix does not tell us, which
trading rule the agent is currently using. This information is contained inMarkus Demary
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the matrix Γt, where Γt(i,j) is one if agent i uses the trading rule j and
zero otherwise. Thus, the row sum of this matrix is one, because an agent
can only use one trading rule at the same time.
We assume that agents switch to the trading rule, which was the most suc-
cessful in the past if they are allowed to switch. Therefore agents calculate
the proﬁts each trading rule yielded over the last N periods. The vector of














where the agents realizes a proﬁt of zero if he stays inactive.
















for i ∈ {c,f} and n = 1,...,N.
Table 1: Cash Flows of Short-term and Long-term Traders
Short-term Trader












time t t + 1 ... t + N
d
i,N




(1 − τ)2(1 + R∗
t,N)NSt+N
 
Here we replaced the forecast E
i
t−nst with the realized exchange rate st.
Thus, π
i,n
t measures the proﬁt per unit currency that results from the ex-Markus Demary
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change rate change and the interest rate diﬀerential times the amount of
currency demanded. This expression is similar to the one used in Grimaldi
(2004) and DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (****) with the diﬀerence that we scale
the proﬁt per unit currency by the currency demanded by the agent.
The vector Π∗
t has the entry one at the same place, where Πt has its
maximum and zeros at all other entries. Thus, this vector indicates to which
trader type the agent has to switch if he is allowed to switch. The switching
of agents is conducted, by replacing the pertinent row in the matrix Γt with
the vector Πt. This operation is conducted if an agent is allowed to switch.
This is possible if the condition
S(i,j) = 1 & Γ(i,j) = 1 (26)
holds. If
S(i,j) = 0 & Γ(i,j) = 1, (27)
then Γ(i,j) = 1, that means, the agent is not allowed to switch and has to
use his old trading strategy. In all other cases the matrix Γ(i,j) has the
entry zero.
The information about the number of agents, who are allowed to trade and
the number of agents being using one special trading rule is contained in
these matrices.
2.5 Institutional Properties and Price Setting
The market maker collects all individual demands in order to determine the
market demand. Individual demands d
i,n
t can be aggregated to the market
demand Dt by adding them, while weighting them with the populationMarkus Demary
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fractions w
i,n



































Agents are allowed to trade at the beginning of their investment and at the
end of their investment. They have to pay back the loan they raised in order
to invest which is denoted in their home currency and because they want
to consume in their home country. The last eﬀect is captured by the last
term in this equation.
If market demand is positive, the market maker will rise the price of the
exchange rate, while he will lower it, if market demand is negative. Thus
the exchange rate changes proportional to the sum of all market orders.
The behavior of the market maker can be approximated by the following
price impact function3
st+1 = st + βstDt. (30)





Thus, the model is complete now. Because it cannot be solved analytically,
we will rely on results derived by numerical simulations in the next section.
3Kyle (1985) derives this price impact function as the solution of his continuous double
auction model. Lux and Marchesi (2000) and Westerhoﬀ (2003) also use this pricing
rule within an agent-based-framework.Markus Demary
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3 Non-Stochastic Steady States
At the steady state all shocks will be zero and all variables will be constant.
Thus a steady state is characterized by
εt = ε
∗
t = 0 (32)
and




t−1 = R∗,st = st−1 = s, (33)
di,t = di,t−1 = 0,πi,t = πi,t−1 = 0, (34)
while the population fractions are undetermined.
Summing up, the steady state is characterized by equal rates of return
in both countries and no exchange rate change. Therefore we get zero
demands and zero proﬁts, because the exchange rate equals its no-arbitrage
fundamental value.
4 Simulation Results
The model is simulated with the parameters given in table 2. For the
baseline simulation we set the transaction tax rate to zero in order to have
a benchmark for the policy simulations conducted later.Markus Demary
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Table 2: Calibrated Parameters for Baseline Simulation
Model Parameters
mean reversion parameters standard deviations of shocks
α1 = 0.96 α2 = 0.96 σ1 = 0.03 σ2 = 0.03
risk aversion parameters max. horizon simulation length
δC = 1 δF = 1 N = 100 T = 100000
exchange rate response forecasting parameters
β = 0.01 κC = 0.9 κF = 0.8
transaction tax number of agents
τ = 0 300
Note: These parameters are used for the baseline simulation of the model without trans-
action taxes.
We assume the interest rates in both countries to be quite persistent because
empirical exchange rate data are also quite near a unit-root process. Thus,
we assume the two interest rate processes to follow
lnRt = 0.04   1.005 + 0.96   lnRt−1 + 0.03   εt, εt ∼ N(0,1). (35)
For the risk aversion we assume chartist traders and fundamentalist traders
to have the same value for the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion.




t st+n − st = 0.9
n(st − st−1), (36)
such that their forecasting model predicts a return of 0.9 for the next period,
if the current return is one and the two-period return to be 0.81.Markus Demary
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For the fundamentalist traders we assume that they expect exchange rate




t st+n − st = 0.8   0.2
n−1   (s
f
t − st). (37)
Furthermore, we set the exchange rate response to
st+1 = st + 0.01   stDt. (38)
4.1 The Baseline Simulation
Figures 3 and 4 show the simulation outcome of the baseline model with-
out taxes. The exchange rate shows a random walk like behavior like empir-
ical ﬁnancial time series. One can clearly see that the time series displays
periods of trends and crashes as we typically ﬁnd in ﬁnancial market time
series.Markus Demary
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Fig. 3: Exchange Rate: Baseline Simulation
























Note: Model generated time series from the baseline simulation. The used parameter
values are those given in table 2. The ﬁrst 1000 data points were removed.
A second stylized fact which the model is able to reproduce is volatility
clustering and excess kurtosis which can be seen from figure 4.Markus Demary
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Fig. 4: Exchange Rate: Baseline Simulation































Note: Model generated time series from the baseline simulation. The used parameter
values are those given in table 2. The ﬁrst 1000 data points were removed.
Both, in empirical time series as well as in the model produced time series
periods of high volatility and periods of low volatility tend to cluster to-
gether. Moreover as can be seen in the ﬁgure is, that extreme returns are
realized quite frequently.
By looking at figure 5 we can analyze this phenomenon in greater detail.
The upper subﬁgure shows a quantile-quantile-plot with respect to the nor-
mal distribution. Here quantiles of the standard normal distribution are
plotted against the quantiles of the empirical return distribution. If the
data is normally distributed all points should lie on the 45◦ line.Markus Demary
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Fig. 5: Return Distribution: Baseline Simulation










































Note: Model generated time series from the baseline simulation. The used parameter
values are those given in table 1. The blue line represents the kernel density of the
model generated exchange rate returns, while the green line is the density of a normally
distributed random variable with the same mean and the same variance. The ﬁrst 1000
data points were removed. The used parameter values are those given in table 2.
From this ﬁgure we can see deviations from the normal distribution in the
positive and negative extreme parts. In the lower subﬁgure the estimated
kernel density of the returns is plotted together with the density of a nor-
mally distributed random variable with the same mean and variance as the
input sample for comparison. From this ﬁgure can be seen that the density
of the model generated data has a higher peak and fatter tails with respect
to the normal distribution which means that this distribution is leptokurtic.Markus Demary
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The phenomenon of volatility clustering can be analyzed in more detail from
figure 5.
Fig. 6: Autocorrelation Functions: Baseline Simulation




























Autocorrelation Function: Raw Returns






























Autocorrelation Function: Squared Returns
Note: Model generated time series from the baseline simulation. The used parameter
values are those given in table 2. The ﬁrst 1000 data points were removed.
Figure 6 plots the autocorrelation function of returns and squared returns
for 100 lags. Here, raw returns display only small serial correlation which
means that exchange rate returns are not predictable from their past data.
This ﬁnding is in line with the eﬃcient market hypothesis. In contrast to this
squared returns display strong correlations over 100 lags. This indicates that
although returns themselves are uncorrelated they are not independently
distributed because squared returns display high serial dependencies. WeMarkus Demary
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t|It−1] + vt. (40)
Therefore, high serial correlations of squared returns indicates that volatility
is serially correlated and therefore predictable. Small correlations in returns
and large correlations in squared returns can also be found in empirical date
as you can see in figure 6. Thus, our model is also able to replicate this
stylized fact of ﬁnancial data.
Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Baseline Simulation
Model USD-Euro YEN-USD GBP-USD
mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
st. deviation 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006
skewness -0.021 0.014 -0.487 -0.135
kurtosis 4.549 3.619 7.335 6.573
ARCH 0.285 0.014 0.056 0.065
GARCH 0.715 0.977 0.942 0.922
Note: Mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis are calculated from the model generated
exchange rate return data by using the parameters given in table 2. ARCH and GARCH
are the coeﬃcients of an GARCH(1,1) model ﬁtted to the model generated return data.
The exchange rate data used in columns 3,4 and 5 are taken from the FRED2 database
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in daily frequency. The data is available under
the series-ID: DEXUSEU, DEXJPUS, and DEXUSUK.Markus Demary
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Table 3 contains summary statistics of the baseline simulation in compar-
ison with summary statistics of empirical exchange rate return data. The
mean of simulated returns and empirical returns is always zero, while the
variance of the model equals the empirical returns because of the model
calibration. The kurtosis of empirical data and of the baseline simulation is
always greater than 3, which is the kurtosis of a normally distributed ran-
dom variable. This fact also could be seen from the quantile-quantile-plot
and the kernel density graphs. Moreover, we ﬁtted a GARCH(1,1) model to
the baseline simulation data and the empirical data. The GARCH-model





while the variance is assumed to follow an autoregressive process
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New information about volatility can enter the model through squared re-
turns, while the last term measures the persistency of volatility. Empirical
studies usually ﬁnd α to be less than 0.1 and β approximately 0.9, with
α+β close to one. This is an indication of the strong persistency in volatil-
ity. From table 3 you can infer, that this fact can also be found in estimates
for the three exchange rate return time series as well as for the model gen-
erated return time series. Thus, our model is also able to replicate this
stylized fact.Markus Demary
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Fig. 7: Fraction of Fundamentalist and Technical Traders: Baseline
Simulation
















Note: Model generated time series from the baseline simulation. The used parameter
values are those given in table 2. The ﬁrst 1000 data points were removed.
Figure 7 plots the evolution of the population fractions of traders using
the technical trading rules and the fundamental trading rules. We can
clearly see from this ﬁgure that from time to time majorities for one of this
two trading rules emerge. It seems that the system is switching between
states in which one of the two rules is used by all traders and that their
view changes surprisingly. This is an indication of herding behavior among
traders. If we compare this ﬁgure with figure 4 we see that the periods
in which one of the two trading rules dominates the market correspond to
the high volatility and low volatility period in the exchange rate returns.Markus Demary
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Thus, herding behavior is a source of the volatility clusters produced by the
model.
Fig. 8: Fraction of Short-run and Long-run Traders: Baseline Simulation
















Note: Model generated time series from the baseline simulation. The used parameter
values are those given in table 2. The ﬁrst 1000 data points were removed.
Figure 8 plots the time variation of population fractions of traders hav-
ing either short-term investment horizons or long-term investment horizons.
Similar to figure 7 the system is switching between the two views of the
world. Thus, the market is either dominated by long-term traders or by
short-term traders. The dominance of short-term traders is an indication
of speculative attacks on one currency. If we compare this ﬁgure to figure
4 we can again see that speculative attacks correspond to high volatility
periods in the exchange rate returns.Markus Demary
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All in all, this section showed, that our model is able to reproduce devi-
ations of the exchange rate from the fundamental value, random walk or
martingale behavior of the exchange rate, volatility clustering and fat tails
in the distribution. Moreover, we learn about traders behavior that our ﬁ-
nancial market is characterized by herding behavior of traders. The market
is either dominated by traders using trend-extrapolating trading rules or
trading rules based on economic fundamentals. Moreover we see that the
market is characterized by periods dominated by long-term or by short-term
traders. This is an indication of speculative attacks on one currency.
The success of our model in replicating stylized facts of ﬁnancial data en-
courages to use it for economic policy analysis by varying the transaction
tax rate in order to analyze the eﬀects of transaction taxes on ﬁnancial risks.
This we will do in the next section.
4.2 Sensitivity to Transaction Tax Rate Changes
4.2.1 Statistical Properties of the Exchange Rate
Table 4 shows summary statistics of the model generated exchange rate
returns for diﬀerent values of the transaction tax rate.Markus Demary
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Table 4: Variation of the Transaction Tax
τ 0% 1% 2% 4% 6%
mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SE (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
variance 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002
SE (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
skewness 0.051 0.084 0.206 0.369 0.425
SE (0.102) (0.242) (0.481) (0.774) (0.817)
kurtosis 3.617 5.923 9.911 15.048 16.667
SE (0.649) (4.178) (6.787) (8.929) (9.632)
Note: The remaining parameters are set to the values given in table 2. The statistics
are averages of 100 simulation runs of size 1000. The used parameter values are those
given in table 2. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.Markus Demary
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The statistics reported in this table are averages over 100 simulation runs of
size 1000. From the table one can infer that the mean exchange rate return
does not change due to changes in the transaction tax rate, while their
variance is monotonically declining. Moreover one can see that although
positive transaction tax rates reduce the variance of exchange rate returns
they rise their kurtosis. Thus, positive transaction tax rates increase the
probability of extreme positive and negative returns. This limits the success
of taxes to reduce risks in foreign exchange markets.
4.2.2 Fundamental Traders and Technical Traders
From table 5 one can infer how positive transaction tax rates inﬂuence
traders behavior. The numbers belonging to this table are also averages
over 100 simulation runs of size 1000 and are based on the same seed of ran-
dom numbers like the statistics in table 3. From this table one can infer
that the number of traders using the fundamental trading rules is decreas-
ing in the transaction tax rate while the number of traders using chartist
rules is increasing. Moreover, the number of traders staying inactive are
rising slightly in the transaction tax rate. Thus, under positive transac-
tion tax rates chartist rules are more proﬁtable than fundamental trading
rules which is a contradiction to the conventional view of the proponents
of a securities transaction tax who propose that traders will rely more on
economic fundamentals under positive tax rates.Markus Demary
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Table 5: Average Percentage Fractions of Used Trading Rules
τ 0% 1% 2% 4% 6%
fundamental 0.875 0.847 0.787 0.750 0.756
SE (0.107) (0.102) (0.085) (0.080) (0.070)
technical 0.125 0.152 0.212 0.249 0.242
SE (0.107) (0.101) (0.085) (0.080) (0.070)
inactive 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
SE (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
short-term 0.868 0.633 0.413 0.256 0.228
SE (0.113) (0.217) (0.197) (0.127) (0.110)
long-term 0.132 0.366 0.586 0.743 0.770
SE (0.113) (0.217) (0.197) (0.127) (0.110)
inactive 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
SE (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Note: Average percentage fractions of used trading rules during a typical simulation run
for diﬀerent transaction tax rates τ. The results of each column are based on the same
seed of random variables. The statistics are averages of 100 simulation runs of size 1000.
The used parameter values are those given in table 2. Standard errors are reported in
parenthesis.
4.2.3 Short-term and Long-term Traders
From table 5 one can also infer that the number of short term traders is
decreasing in the transaction tax rate while the number of long term traders
is increasing. This is in line with the conventional view that a transaction
tax makes short term trading more costly and therefore prevents speculative
attacks in favor of long term investments.Markus Demary
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5 Conclusion
This study wants to analyze the eﬀectiveness of a transaction tax within an
agent-based framework. We propose a new model for the foreign exchange
market with four types of agents: short- and long term fundamentalists and
short- and long-term chartists. Stochastic interest rates in both countries
lead to temporal arbitrage opportunities and therefore to demand for foreign
currency. A market maker aggregates the agents’ market orders and rises the
exchange rate due to positive excess demand and lowers it due to negative
excess demand.
Simulations of the baseline model without transaction taxes produce time
series with realistic time series properties like in empirical exchange rate
date. This means that the model is capable to reproduce stylized facts of ﬁ-
nancial variables like the unit root property, volatility clustering and excess
kurtosis. A comparison with empirical data shows that the model is able
to replicate these stylized facts very well. Moreover, our ﬁnancial market
is characterized by periods dominated by traders using trend-extrapolating
trading rules or by trading rules based on economic fundamentals. Further-
more, periods emerge which are dominated either by short-term speculators
or by long-term investors. This is an indication of sudden speculative at-
tacks on one currency.
The economic policy analysis of our model shows that positive transaction
taxes are capable of reducing volatility. The disadvantage of this policy
instrument is, that the probability of extreme positive or negative exchange
rate returns is increased. That means higher transaction tax rate increases
the kurtosis of the return distribution. The tax alters traders behavior by
reducing short-term speculation in favor of long-term investments, which isMarkus Demary
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in line with the arguments of the proponents of the Tobin tax. In contrast
to their view, in our model the tax favors trend extrapolating trading rules
an punished trading rules based on economic fundamentals. Because trend
extrapolating trading rules are a source of destabilization of the exchange
rate, this can be the reason why the transaction tax increases the kurtosis
of the return distribution.
Summing up, further research should look for analytical solutions to a sim-
pliﬁed version of this model and for extensions by the incorporation of other
long-term investment strategies into the model in order to get more infor-
mation about the eﬀectiveness of transaction taxes on traders’ behavior and
the reduction of risks in ﬁnancial markets.
6 Appendix: Derivation of the Multi-Period
Forecasts
6.1 Fundamentalists’ Forecasts
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If fundamentalists want to forecast the exchange rate st+n, they have to
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By applying the rule for the geometric series, we can write this as
E
f
tst+n = st +
 





t − st). (47)
6.2 Chartists’ Forecasts






c(st − st−1), (48)Markus Demary
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t(st+n−1 − st+n−2) (50)
= (κ
c)
n(st − st−1). (51)
For forecasting the future exchange rate st+n chartists have to forecast the
exchange rate changes as we have done before and then to calculate
E
c
tst+n = st + E
c
t[st+1 − st] + E
c
t[st+2 − st+1] + ... + E
c
t[st+n − st+n−1] (52)
= st + κ
c(st − st−1) + (κ
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By applying the formula for the geometric series we get
E
c
tst+n = st + κ
c  
(1 − κc)n
1 − κc   (st − st−1). (53)Markus Demary
Transaction Taxes, Traders’ Behavior and Exchange Rate Risks 36
References
[1] Bollerslev, T. (1986), ”Generalized Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 31, 307-327.
[2] Brock, W. and C. Hommes (1997), ”A Rational Route to Random-
ness” Econometrica, Vol. 65, 1059-1095.
[3] Chiarella, C. and T. He (2002), ”An Adaptive Model on Asset
Pricing and Wealth Dynamics with Heterogeneous Trading Strategies,”
Computing in Economics and Finance, Vol. 135, Society for Compu-
tational Economics.
[4] DeGrauwe, P. and M. Grimaldi (2006), ”Exchange Rate Puzzles:
A Tale of Switching Attractors”, European Economic Review, Vol. 50,
1-33.
[5] Engel, C. and J. Hamilton (1990), ”Long Swings in the Dollar:
Are They in the Data and do Markets Know It”, American Economic
Review, Vol. 80, 689-713.
[6] Farmer. D. and S. Joshi (2002), ”The Price Dynamics of Common
Trading Stategies”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
Vol. 49, 149-171.
[7] Kyle, A. (1985), ”Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading”, Econo-
metrica, Vol. 53, 1315-1336.
[8] Lux, T. and M. Marchesi (2000), ”Volatility Clustering in Finan-
cial Markets: A Micro-Simulation of Interacting Agents”, Journal of
Theoretical and Applied Finance, Vol. 3, 675-702.
[9] Mannaro, K., M. Marchesi and A. Setzu (2005),Markus Demary
Transaction Taxes, Traders’ Behavior and Exchange Rate Risks 37
”The Impact of Transaction Taxes on Traders’ Behavior and
Wealth: A Microsimulation” , Working Paper, available at:
http://www.essex.ac.uk/wehia05/Paper/Parallel4/Session3/
MarchesiM.pdf
[10] Menkhoff, L. (1997), ”Examining the Use of Technical Currency
Analysis”, International Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 2,
307-318.
[11] Taylor, M. and H. Allen (1992), ”The Use of Technical Analysis
in the Foreign Exchange Market”, Journal of International Money and
Finance, Vol. 11, 304-314.
[12] Vigfusson, R. (1997), ”Switching between Chartists and Fundamen-
talists: A Markov Regime-Switching Approach” Journal of Interna-
tional Money and Finance, Vol. 2, 291-305.
[13] Westerhoff, F. (2003), ”Heterogeneous Traders and the Tobin Tax”,
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 13, 53-70.